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1. Introduction 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) show that loser stocks over the past three to five years 
outperform winners by 25% over the next three years. Many subsequent studies report 
evidence of long-term reversals in major international equity markets.
1
 However, the causes 
of these reversals are highly controversial in the literature. Prominent behavioural theories 
suggest that reversals occur due to investors’ behavioural biases in forecasting firm growth 
(DeBondt and Thaler, 1987; Daniel et al., 1998; Barberis et al., 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999). 
In contrast to the behavioural interpretation, rational asset pricing models suggest that 
reversals are compensations that investors receive for holding risky assets (Fama and French, 
1993, 1996; Zhang, 2005; Liu, 2006). Fama and French (1993, 1996) attribute reversals to 
distress risk. They argue that, because losers are distressed, their future returns are expected 
to be higher than those of winners. Consistent with rational explanations, Klein (2001) and 
George and Hwang (2007) also contend that reversals are caused by investors’ rational 
reactions, possibly reflecting a delay in the payment of capital gains taxes.  
 This study contributes to this ongoing debate by investigating whether, how and why 
industry performance can drive long-term return reversals. As firms in the same industry 
share similar fundamentals and are affected by common shocks, arising from shifts in 
demand and supply for their products, industry components can cause the returns of these 
firms to comove (e.g. Welch, 2004; Mackay and Philips, 2005). The rational view of asset 
pricing suggests that this comovement represents industry-specific risk. Theoretical asset 
pricing models demonstrate that a firm’s risk and returns can be a function of its industry 
characteristics (e.g. Berk et al., 1999; Calson et al., 2004, 2014; Peress, 2010; Bustamante, 
2015).
2
 Consistent with theoretical predictions, empirical studies document that industry 
components can explain asset pricing regularities (e.g. Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999; Hou 
and Robinson, 2006; Hameed and Mian, 2015). Kogan (2001), Zhang (2005) and Hou et al. 
(2015) show that firms have greater investment adjustment costs in downturn industries. 
Thus, the potential risk associated with having irreversible investments in place can cause 
higher returns for firms operating in poorly performing industries than for those in well 
performing industries. The models of Fama and French (1997) and Cohen et al. (2003) 
                                                          
1
 E.g. Chou et al. (2007) in Japan, Clare and Thomas (1995) in the UK and George and Hwang (2007) in the US. 
2
 Fama and French (1997) find that neither the Sharp-Linter-Black capital asset pricing model (CAPM) nor their 
three-factor model can precisely estimate industry costs of equity. Lewellen et al. (2010) show that macro-
economic (e.g. consumption, consumption-to-wealth, and investment-to-growth) based asset pricing models fail 
to explain cross-sectional returns for industry portfolios. 
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indicate that poor past performance represents distress risk. Hence, firms in losing industries 
are expected to offer higher returns to their shareholders for bearing industry distress risk.  
The behavioural models proposed by Daniel et al. (1998), Barberis et al. (1998) and 
Hong and Stein (1999) may also offer some insight into why industry performance may drive 
long-term return reversals. In Daniel et al.’s model, investors exhibit overconfidence and self-
attribution biases. The degree of investors’ overconfidence and self-attribution may vary over 
time and across industries, causing excessive mispricing and return reversals in certain 
industries. Similarly, Barberis et al. (1998) and Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) demonstrate 
that representativeness bias causes mispricing. If investors focus more on industry than firm 
specific news, the representativeness bias can lead them to extrapolate performance too far 
from the industry as a whole, yielding long-term reversals in industry returns. Finally, 
industries are viewed as the primary channel through which to disseminate information (e.g. 
Hong et al., 2007; Hou, 2007). In a complete and frictionless market, firms react to new 
information instantaneously, and industry portfolios would have no informational advantage 
over individual stocks in predicting returns. However, theoretical models and empirical 
evidence show that analyst coverage and institutional holdings are clustered at the industry 
level (e.g. Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Irvine and Pointiff, 2009; Peress, 2010). This 
clustering may result in a lead-lag effect within industries, as analysts and institutional 
investors usually pay more attention to industry leaders. The slow diffusion of information 
from industry leaders to followers can cause the latter to underreact to news. When traders 
seek to exploit sluggish price adjustments, they can create excess momentum and subsequent 
reversals may happen as prices revert back to their equilibrium levels (e.g. Hong and Stein, 
1999).  
Given the above arguments, it is surprising that little attention is given to the industry 
reversals and their role in explaining stock reversals. This study fills the gap. Using stocks 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), we find significant long-term industry reversals 
in the UK market. Specifically, we show that stocks in losing industries outperform those in 
winning industries over the subsequent five years after controlling for industry and stock 
momentum effects, seasonal patterns and traditional risk factors. We also show that industry 
reversals are stronger and more significant than stock reversals. In particular, we find that 
industry reversals are present in all calendar months, in neutral (neither winner nor loser) 
stocks and after adjusting for past stock performance. However, stock reversals exhibit strong 
seasonal patterns, are non-existent in neutral (neither winning nor losing) industries and 
disappear when we control for past industry performance. This evidence supports the 
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prediction that industry components drive long-term return reversals. In the subsequent 
analysis, we also investigate whether the long-term industry reversals are consistent with 
rational explanations or are a result of mispricing. To this end, we investigate whether stock 
and industry reversals survive after stringent risk adjustments. We estimate risk-adjusted 
contrarian returns using both the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model and the Fama 
and French (2015) five-factor model
3
. We find that stock reversals completely disappear after 
adjusting for risk, while industry reversals remain positive and significant, albeit weak in the 
five-factor model. Since industry reversals are not fully explained by risk factors, it is 
plausible that mispricing is also at play. To shed further light on this issue, we compare the 
performance of the industry contrarian strategies in different states of the economy. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) argue that, if loser stocks are fundamentally riskier than winner 
stocks, then contrarian strategies should not be profitable in bad states, in which the marginal 
utility of wealth is high, making loser stocks unattractive to risk-averse investors. However, if 
industry reversals represent a form of market inefficiency, one would expect them to be more 
pronounced in industries with high information uncertainty (see, e.g., Hirshleifer et al., 2013). 
We find that the abnormal returns of industry contrarian strategies do exist in bad states of the 
economy, but are higher in industries with less competition, high accruals, high idiosyncratic 
volatility and low analyst coverage
4
. These findings suggest that industry reversals are more 
likely to represent mispricing than driven by fundamental risk.   
This study contributes to the literature in many ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to study long-term industry reversals and their impact on the well-
documented effect of long-term stock reversals. Our study is related to the work of 
Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), who document a strong industry component in the short-
term stock momentum anomaly. However, while several studies argue that short-term 
momentum and long-term reversals are related (Hong and Stein, 1998; Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 2001), others show that they are two independent phenomena (George and Hwang, 
2004)
5
. Thus, whether industry reversals have an impact on stock reversals remains an open 
empirical question. In this study, we document the presence of strong industry reversals, 
                                                          
3
 Note that it is yet to be established whether the profitability and investment factors in Fama and French (2015) 
reflect rational risk or mispricing. See Hou et al. (2015) for further discussions.   
4
 Dhaliwal et al. (2011) use accruals as a proxy for information opacity, Hong et al. (2000) use firm size as a 
proxy for investors’ attention, and Kumar (2009) uses idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for valuation 
uncertainty. 
5
 George and Hwang (2004, 2007) show that the momentum captured by the nearness of a stock’s price to its 
52-week high does not reverse in the long term.  
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which fully subsume the stock reversals. This finding has important implications for the asset 
pricing literature. Specifically, while several early studies show that contemporaneous 
industry returns have little impact on stock returns (e.g. Fama and French, 1997; Heston and 
Rouwenhorst, 1994; Griffin and Karolyi, 1998), we find that past industry performance 
strongly affects future stock returns. Second, we investigate whether the importance of 
industry returns in the conditional asset pricing is consistent with rational expectations or is 
better explained by behavioural biases. We find that industry reversals are more consistent 
with behavioural explanations and represent a challenge to the rational asset pricing models. 
Third, we evaluate the ability of the Fama and French (2015) five-factor model to explain 
anomalies outside the US. Using data from the UK, we find that the five-factor model fully 
explains the stock return reversals, but its ability to explain industry return reversals is 
relatively limited. Finally, the institutional setting of the UK market provides a unique 
opportunity to test the role of taxes in long-term return reversals. George and Hwang (2007) 
show that stock reversals in the US come exclusively in January. Since the UK tax year end is 
5 April, investigating stock reversals in the month of April helps us understand whether the 
strong January reversals in the US are caused by tax loss selling or are merely the turn-of-the-
year effect. Consistent with the tax loss selling argument, we find that stock reversals in the 
UK are particularly strong in April. However, the finding that industry reversals are not 
confined to the months of January or April is inconsistent with the tax loss selling hypothesis.    
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
the methodology. Section 3 provides summary statistics. Section 4 provides empirical results, 
and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data, variables and methodology 
2.1 Sample data 
Our sample consists of all stocks listed on the LSE from January 1970 to December 2011. 
The stock monthly and daily return series, market capitalisations, international industry 
classifications (ICB) and firm characteristics are extracted from Thomson Reuters 
DataStream. We only include common stock, filtering on the data type and company name 
(e.g. Griffin et al., 2010; Ince and Porter, 2006)
6
. The final sample includes a total of 6,216 
stocks with 995,717 firm-month observations. This sample is considerably larger than those 
                                                          
6
 Details on the screening procedures are provided in Appendix A1. 
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used in prior UK studies
7
. Since DataStream reports the stock return index (RI) to the nearest 
hundredth, stock returns computed from the RI measure may round very small returns to zero 
values. To avoid potential rounding errors, we set a monthly return to be missing if the RI is 
less than or equal to 0.10. If a stock is delisted and no delisting reason is given in 
DataStream, we assign the last trading month return as -50%. Shumway (1997) finds that -
30% is the average return for delisted firms traded over the counter. Setting a delisting return 
lower than that of Shumway would cause a downward bias in the magnitude of long-term 
return reversals.  
The industry classification is based on the 20 ICB super-sectors, which is an 
international standard industry classification for stocks outside the US markets
8
. This 
classification strikes a balance between having enough stocks in an industry and grouping 
stocks with homogeneous business environments together. The average number of stocks for 
each super-sector in each month is provided in Table 1. The table shows that stocks are not 
evenly distributed across each super-sector, ranging from 364 in industrial goods and services 
to 6 in the automobile and parts industry. Because the automobile and parts and 
telecommunications industries include fewer than 20 stocks, we use the remaining 18 
industries to construct long-term winning and losing industry portfolios
9
.  
2.2 Variable construction 
(i) Stock’s five-year past performance measure (stock_5yret): This measures a 
stock’s return over the past 60-month period, 60
60
t t
t
P P
P


 , plus the return from 
reinvesting dividends. Following DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) and George 
and Hwang (2007), we set the 5-year winner (loser) dummy to unity if a stock is 
ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in terms of the five-year performance 
measure in a given month and zero otherwise. 
(ii) Long-term winning and losing industries: We construct the industries’ monthly 
return indexes (RI) based on the value-weighted monthly returns of stocks within 
                                                          
7
 While Clare and Thomas (1995) employ a random sample of 1,000 UK stocks, Wu and Li (2011) use 1,745 
UK stocks that are constituents of the FTSE All Share Index. 
8
 The ICB systems use four tiers of classifications, namely 10 industries, 20 super-sectors, 41 sectors, and 114 
sub-sectors. Thomson Reuters Datastream provides only static information on ICB. It is possible that firms’ 
industry classifications change over time. However, since the super-sectors are reasonably broad, these changes 
probably do not occur frequently.  
9
 Our results are not sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of the two industries among the benchmark 
industries. Further results are available upon request.   
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the industries. Industry five-year past performance (ind_5yret) is measured as
60
60
t t
t
RI RI
RI


 . The long-term winning (losing) industries are defined as the three 
industries with the highest (lowest) ind_5yret (e.g. Moskowiz and Grinblatt, 
1999). We also set the 5-year winning (losing) Ind dummy to unity if a stock 
belongs to winning (losing) industries and zero otherwise.   
(iii) Within-industry winners and losers: We create long-term within-industry winners 
and losers according to an individual stock’s five-year return ranking within its 
industry. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks in a given industry are defined as 
within-industry winners (losers). Ind 5year winner
within
 (Ind 5year loser
within
) is a 
dummy variable with a value of one if a stock is a within-industry winner (loser) 
and zero otherwise. The setting of within-industry winners and losers tests 
whether long-term return reversals are a within-industry effect, while the 
construction of winning and losing industries assesses whether the reversals are an 
inter-industry effect.  
(iv) Stock momentum: We use the price relative to the 52-week high to control for the 
stock momentum effect. Following George and Hwang (2004), we define 
52wkhWinner (52wkhLoser) as a dummy variable that equals one if i
i
P
high
 is 
ranked among the top (bottom) 30% of all sample stocks in month t, and zero 
otherwise. Here, 
iP  is the price of stock i at the end of month t and ihigh is the 
highest month-end price of stock i during the 12-month period that ends on the 
last day of month t. George and Hwang (2004) find that the 52-week high (52wkh) 
measure is superior to the 12-month past performance measure (Jegdeesh and 
Titiman, 1993) and the industry 12-month past performance measure (Moskowitz 
and Grinblatt, 1999) in capturing short-term momentum.  
(v) Industry momentum effect: Following Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999), we select 
the three best and worst performing industries according to each industry’s value-
weighted past 12-month returns (i.e. ind_12m_ret= 12
12
t t
t
RI RI
RI


 ). We then set the 
IndMomWinner (IndMomLoser) dummy to unity if a stock belongs to momentum 
winning (losing) industries and zero otherwise.  
(vi) Neutral portfolios: We use two dummy variables to denote neutral stocks and 
neutral industries. stockNeutral  is equal to one if a stock belongs to neither the five-
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year winner nor loser portfolio and zero otherwise. Similarly, industryNeutral  is equal 
to one if a stock belongs to neither the long-term winning nor losing industries and 
zero otherwise. We interact stockNeutral  with 5-year winning Ind. and then with 5-
year losing Ind. to capture the return pattern of long-term winning and losing 
industries with neutral stock performance, respectively. We also interact
industryNeutral  with 5-year winner and then with 5-year loser to identify the return 
pattern of winner and loser stocks with neutral industry performance, respectively. 
The four interaction terms evaluate the wideness of reversals. Specifically, we 
examine whether stock reversals exist in neutral industries and whether industry 
reversals are present among neutral stocks.   
(vii) Excess industry and stock portfolios: We redefine five-year winner and loser 
stocks in terms of excess industry returns. An excess industry return is calculated 
as a stock’s five-year return minus the five-year value-weighted return of the 
industry that the stock belongs to. All stocks are then ranked by their industry 
excess returns in a given month. A dummy variable 5year winner
Excess
 (5year 
loser
Excess
) is equal to one if a stock is in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks 
according to the excess industry return, and zero otherwise. This new approach to 
identifying winner and loser stocks takes into account past industry performance. 
We also redefine long-term winning and losing industries in terms of excess stock 
returns. All stocks are first placed into quintile portfolios according to their past 
five-year performance (stock_5yret). An individual stock’s excess return is 
computed as the stock’s five-year return minus the value-weighted five-year 
return of the quintile portfolio to which the stock belongs. The excess returns on 
individual stocks are then averaged within each industry. The new long-term 
winning and losing industries are defined as the three industry portfolios with the 
highest (lowest) average excess stock returns. We set the 5year winning Ind
Excess
 
(5year losing Ind
Excess
) dummy to unity if the stock belongs to one of the new 
winning (losing) industries and zero otherwise. This approach takes into account 
past stock performance in the process of identifying the winning and losing 
industries. The four dummies described above can evaluate the depth of reversals 
between stocks and industries. If past industry performance drives long-term 
return reversals, industry reversals should not be wiped out after being adjusted 
for past stock performance. Alternatively, if past stock performance is responsible 
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for the reversals, stock reversals should not disappear after being adjusted for past 
industry performance. 
 
2.3 Methodology             
Following George and Hwang (2004), Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) and George and 
Hwang (2007), we use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) style regression to measure and 
compare returns to different long-term investment strategies. This approach has the advantage 
of isolating the return to a particular investment strategy by controlling for other factors that 
could affect returns. It also allows us to assess the performance of the long-term investment 
strategies across different investment horizons.    
If an investor formulates portfolios of winners and losers every month and holds 
these portfolios for the next T months, the return earned in a given month t is the equal-
weighted average of the returns to T portfolios, each formed in one of the past T months t-j 
(for j=1 to T).
10
 Thus, the contribution of the portfolio formed in month t-j to the month-t 
return can be estimated by the following cross-sectional regression:  
 
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 ,
6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , 10 , 11
52 52
5
5 5
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j
jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
jt i t j jt i t j
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser
b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser b yearWinner
b yearLoser b yearwinningInd b
    
  
 
     
  
   ,5jt i t j ijtyearlosingInd e 
     (1)                
where Rit is the return to stock i in month t;  sizei,t-1 is the log of market capitalisation; Ri,t-1  is 
the previous month’s return; BMi,t-1 is the past month’s book-to-market ratio; and the 
remaining eight dummy variables are as defined earlier. The deviations from the cross-
sectional means of sizei,t-1, Ri,t-1 and BMi,t-1 are included in the regression to control for the 
size effect, the bid-ask bounce and the book-to-market effect, respectively
11
.  
                                                          
10 The portfolio formation and testing technique used here is in the same spirit as Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), 
which avoids test statistics that are based on overlapping returns. This technique makes use of the fact that 
ranking on the past 60 months and holding for the next 60 months produces a time series of monthly returns in 
which each month’s return is a combination of 60 ranking strategies. For example, a January 2000 reversal 
strategy return is 1/60 determined by winners and losers from November 1994 to December 1999, 1/60 by 
rankings from October 1994 to November 1999, 1/60 by rankings from September 1994 to October 1999, and 
so on until the last 1/60 is determined by rankings from February 1990 to January 1995. The return estimation 
procedure used here also takes account of other factors in predicting returns.     
11
 For robustness purposes, we also include the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure as an additional control in the 
Fama-MacBeth regression. Our results for industry-contrarian performance remain quantitatively unchanged, 
albeit stock-contrarian performance becomes relatively weak. These results are available upon request.    
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The intercept 0 jtb  is the return to the risk-neutral portfolio that was formulated in 
month t-j and has hedged out the effects of average size, bid-ask bounce, book-to-market, 
momentum and long-term winners and losers in predicting returns. The sum 8ojt jtb b  is the 
month-t return to a portfolio formed in month t-j that is long in five-year winner stocks so as 
to hedge out all other effects. Consequently, 8 jtb  can be interpreted as the return in excess of
0 jtb , achieved by taking a long position in five-year winners j months ago. The remaining 
coefficients have similar interpretations (see Fama, 1976).  
The coefficients of 10 jtb  and 11 jtb  are the equally weighted excess returns for stocks 
belonging to the winning and losing industries, respectively. The coefficient difference 
11 10jt jtb b  can be interpreted as long-term industry contrarian performance resulting from a 
zero investment strategy that is formed by investing equally in stocks that belong to the 
bottom three industries and shorting equally stocks that belong to the top three industries 
(see, e.g. Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999). Similarly, the coefficient difference 9 8jt jtb b  
represents long-term stock contrarian performance resulting from a zero investment strategy 
of investing equally in loser stocks and shorting equally winner stocks. The comparison of 
the performance of these two zero investment strategies is the main interest of this study.    
The total month-t returns include returns to portfolios formed over the prior 60 
months. For example, the total month-t returns to five-year winners and five-year losers can 
be calculated as sums such as 
60
8 8
1
1
60
t jt
j
S b

   and 
60
9 9
1
1
60
t jt
j
S b

  , where the individual 
coefficients are calculated from separate cross-sectional regressions for each j=1,…, 60. 
Dividing by 60 rescales the sums to be monthly returns. We then estimate the time-series 
means of the month-by-month estimates of these sums (e.g. 8 9 10, , ,S S S and 11S ) and their 
Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-statistics. We also obtain risk-adjusted returns for each 
portfolio by employing the Fama-French (1993) three-factor and Fama-French (2015) five-
factor models. Specifically, the time series of each coefficient (e.g. 8 9 10, ,t t tS S S  and 11tS ) is 
regressed on the contemporaneous Fama and French factor realizations to hedge out the 
factor exposure. The intercept (alpha) of the time-series regression is a risk-adjusted return to 
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a particular portfolio. We also regress ( 9 8t tS S  ) and ( 11 10t tS S ) on the Fama-French three 
and five factors to obtain risk-adjusted contrarian returns.  
 
3.  Summary statistics  
Table 1 reports basic characteristics of the 20 industry portfolios. The average percentage of 
total market capitalisation, the five-year raw return, and the five-year excess market return 
are the time-series means of the cross-sectional industry averages in each month. The five-
year raw returns are calculated from the five-year value-weighted industry return indices, and 
the five-year market excess returns are calculated from the five-year industry raw returns 
minus the five-year FTSE All Share market index returns. In terms of the relative market 
capitalisations, the bank sector has the highest market share (of around 20%). However, the 
automobiles and parts industry has the lowest number of firms and the lowest market share 
(of only 0.79%). The average five-year raw and the market excess returns vary considerably 
across industries. The highest (lowest) five-year market excess return of 0.73% (-0.48%) is 
observed in the telecommunications (others) industry.    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 reports the time-series means of the cross-sectional correlations between the 
long-term reversal variables (see the variables in Section 2.2). The positive correlation 
between the five-year winner (loser) stocks and the winning (losing) industries indicates that 
the portfolios formed on past industry performance share some similarities with those based 
on past stock performance. The positive correlation between 5year winning Ind
Excess 
(5year 
losing Ind
Excess
) and 5-year winner (loser) suggests these similarities are maintained after 
adjusting for past stock performance. However, the negative correlation between 5-year 
winner
Excess
 (5-year loser
Excess
) and 5-year winning (losing) Ind implies that the similarities 
disappear after adjusting for past industry performance. These findings highlight the 
importance of adjusting for stock and industry returns when defining long-term winners and 
losers.  
4. Results 
4.1 Identifying long-term industry reversals 
We first estimate Eq. (1) to investigate the presence of long-term industry reversals after 
controlling for other variables that could affect stock returns. Table 3 reports the results for 
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the entire five-year period (columns (11) and (12)) and the five individual holding periods 
(columns (1) to (10)). George and Hwang (2007) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) find 
that losers’ outperformance of winners is significantly weaker outside the calendar month of 
January. They conclude that reversals are likely driven by tax loss selling at the tax year end. 
Since the UK tax year end is 5 April, we report the results separately with January and April 
included and with the two months excluded. This separation allows us to account for both the 
turn-of-the-year and the tax loss selling effects in the long-term return reversals.   
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The key variables in Table 3 are 5year winning Ind., 5year losing Ind., 5-year 
winner and 5-year loser. In column (11), losing industries and loser stocks experience 
significant positive returns of 0.27% (t-statistic=3.86) and 0.11% (t-statistic=2.07) per month, 
respectively, over the five-year period. Column (12) shows that the return for losing 
industries is still significantly positive at 0.30% per month outside January and April. 
However, the return for loser stocks becomes statistically indifferent from zero outside the 
two calendar months. These return patterns indicate that the significantly positive returns on 
loser stocks come exclusively from January and April, while stocks in losing industries 
experience positive returns across all calendar months.   
Columns (1) to (10) show the results for individual holding period. Losing industries 
begin to have significantly positive returns of 0.17% per month in the second year (i.e. in the 
window (13, 24)) after portfolio formation. These returns continue to be positive and 
significant until the fifth year, regardless of whether January and April are included. Loser 
stocks also have significant positive returns of 0.11% per month in the second year, 0.12% 
per month in the third year and 0.16% per month in the fourth year (i.e. in the windows (13, 
24), (25, 36) and (37, 48)). However, columns (4), (6) and (8) show that the returns on loser 
stocks are not statistically significant outside January and April. This finding confirms that 
loser stocks have a strong seasonal return pattern.   
In the last three rows, we evaluate stock and industry contrarian performance.  Over 
the five-year period, losing industries significantly outperform winning industries by 0.29% 
per month (column (11)). This finding is robust to the exclusion of January and April 
(column (12)). The industry contrarian spread is statistically significant from the second to 
the fifth year. Column (11) also suggests that the return on loser stocks is 0.12% per month 
higher than that of winner stocks. However, this outperformance disappears when January 
and April are excluded. The results of the individual holding periods also show that the stock 
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contrarian spread is not significant outside January and April. Thus, the positive returns to 
loser stocks are confined to January and April, while stocks in losing industries have 
persistently higher returns than those in winning industries across all months. In terms of 
economic significance, our results suggest that the industry contrarian spread is at least two 
times greater than the stock contrarian spread (e.g. 0.29% against 0.12% in column (12)).  
The institutional setting of the UK market provides us with a unique opportunity to 
test the role of taxes in long-term return reversals. Unlike that in the US, the UK tax year 
ends on 5 April. The calendar month of April allows us to test the hypothesis that tax loss 
selling
12
 is fully responsible for loser stock reversals (e.g. George and Hwang, 2007; Klein, 
1999). Lakonishok et al. (1991), Sias and Starks (1997) and Ng and Wang (2004) argue that, 
when the calendar year end is approaching, institutional investors “dress” up their portfolios 
by selling stocks with poor past performance
13
 in order to impress their clients with their 
stock-picking skills. The selling pressure depresses the prices of loser stocks in December. 
However, when the pressure eases in January, the prices revert back to equilibrium, causing 
losers to have higher returns. Thus, if this “window dressing” is exclusive to the calendar 
year end, returns in April are more likely to provide a clean test of the tax loss selling 
hypothesis. We run a time-series regression of the contrarian spreads on January and April 
dummy variables. In untabulated results, we find that the January and April dummies are both 
significantly positive in explaining the stock contrarian spread. However, both dummies are 
insignificant in the regression of the industry contrarian spread
14
. These findings imply that 
loser stock reversals can be driven by tax loss selling but it is not an exclusive driving force. 
In contrast, our findings imply that industry reversals are not attributable to tax loss selling or 
the turn-of-the-year effect.  
The remaining variables in Table 3 are included as controls in Eq.(1). The 
significantly negative coefficient on , 1i tR   is consistent with the month-by-month return 
reversals discovered by Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990). The lagged book-to-market 
ratio exhibits a positive relationship with stock returns. The stock momentum effect measured 
                                                          
12
 The tax loss selling hypothesis states that investors seek to reduce their taxes by realising losses at tax year 
end, thereby depressing stock prices. Stock prices revert back to their equilibrium levels in the first month of the 
new tax year, causing higher returns.  
13
 The window dressing effect also affects short-term momentum, as momentum profits are significantly lower 
in January than other calendar months (e.g. Jagadeesh and Titman, 1993; Sias and Starks, 1997).  
14
 These results are available upon request.  
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by the price relative to the 52-week high (George and Hwang, 2004) is much stronger than 
the industry momentum effect (Moskowitz and Grinblatt, 1999)
15
.      
4.2 Comparisons between industry and stock reversals  
In this section, we undertake pairwise nested comparisons of long-term stock reversals and 
long-term industry reversals. We first search for industry reversals among neutral (neither 
loser nor winner) stocks. The nesting procedure is then reversed by examining whether stock 
reversals exist in stocks with neutral industry performance. The results are reported in Table 
4, without control variables for the sake of brevity.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4.2.1 Industry reversals nesting in neutral stock performance 
The two interactions 5stockNeutral yearWinningInd and 5stockNeutral yearLosingInd  are constructed 
in order to identify neutral stocks within winning and losing industries. Panel A shows that 
losing industries with neutral stock performance have a significantly positive return of 0.30% 
per month (column (12)) over the five-year period. In the first year after portfolio formation, 
losing industries with neutral stock performance generate a significantly positive return of 
0.18% per month outside January and April. This return continues to be positive and highly 
significant in the subsequent years, irrespective of whether January and April are included. In 
the fifth year, winning industries with neutral stock performance exhibit a significantly 
negative return of -0.22% per month in all months (column (9)). Consistent with the results in 
Section 4.1, the returns on loser stocks are not significant outside January and April. The last 
two rows in Panel A show the presence of industry contrarian performance in stocks with 
neutral performance. For stocks within the middle 40% in terms of past five-year 
performance, stocks from losing industries  still outperform those from winning industries by 
0.29% per month in all months and by 0.30% per month outside January and April (columns 
(11) and (12)). In individual holding periods, the industry contrarian spread is significantly 
positive from the third to the fifth year (columns (5) to (10)). These findings suggest that 
industry reversals are not confined to stocks with extreme past performance. 
4.2.2 Stock reversals nesting in neutral industry performance  
                                                          
15
 We also use past 12-month returns to identify momentum winners and losers in Eq.(1). Our main results of 
long-term industry reversals remain unchanged. These results are available upon request.    
 16 
 
Panel B in Table 4 provides the results on whether stock contrarian performance exists in 
stocks with neutral industry performance. Columns (11) and (12) show that neither winner 
nor loser stocks with neutral industry performance have significant returns, regardless of 
whether January and April are included. The returns on the winners and the losers in each 
individual holding period are not significant, except in the fourth year (i.e. the window (37, 
48)). The last two rows show that the return to a zero-investment strategy of longing losers 
and shorting winners with neutral industry performance is not significant. In the first year 
after portfolio formation, the contrarian spread is negative and significant at the 10% level. In 
the subsequent years, none of the contrarian profits is significantly different from zero. In 
contrast to the results in Panel A, this evidence implies that extreme stock performance fails 
to generate significant contrarian profits for the portfolio of neutral industry performance.  
4.3 Adjusting for past performance  
This section is designed to evaluate the depth of the two types of reversals. Specifically, stock 
and industry reversals are adjusted by past industry and stock performance, respectively, to 
identify which type of reversals survives after the two adjustments. The main purpose is to 
control for past industry performance in stock reversals and past stock performance in 
industry reversals. 
4.3.1 Stock reversals in excess of past industry performance 
We first investigate whether stock reversals exist after accounting for the industry average 
returns. Recall that the dummy variable 5 year winner
 Excess 
is set to unity for the top 30% of 
stocks with returns in excess of their industry’s five-year average, while the dummy variable 
5 year loser 
Excess
 is equal to unity for the bottom 30% stocks with returns below their 
industry’s five-year average. We refer to these dummies as excess industry portfolios. The 
results are shown in Panel A of Table 5.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Columns (11) and (12) show that the returns to the loser excess industry portfolio 
over the five-year period are not significant. This portfolio’s return is only significantly 
positive in the fourth year (column (7)), for all months, at 0.15%. Recalling Table 3, loser 
stocks have significant positive returns in three individual holding periods. However, here, 
loser stocks have positive returns only in one holding period. The last two rows in Panel A 
provide much stronger evidence in support of the industry effect in the stock reversals. The 
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contrarian returns between the two excess industry portfolios are not significant, irrespective 
of whether January and April are included. The disappearance of stock reversals after 
controlling for industry average returns implies that long-term stock reversals are mainly 
driven by industry components.    
4.3.2 Industry reversals in excess of past stock performance 
Our previous results suggest that stock reversals disappear after controlling for the industry 
effect. Here, we investigate whether the reverse is true. If industry reversals exist and are 
independent of stock reversals, then industry reversals should not disappear after adjusting 
for past stock performance. The two dummy variables 5year winning Ind 
Excess
 and 5year 
losing Ind
Excess
 are specifically designed to account for the impact of past stock performance 
on industry reversals. We refer to these two dummies as excess stock portfolios. The results 
are reported in Panel B.   
Column (11) shows that, over the five-year period, the losing industry excess stock 
portfolio has a significant positive return of 0.16%. The economic magnitude of this return is 
smaller than that in Table 4 (i.e. 0.27%), suggesting that past stock performance only plays a 
partial role in the reversals for losing industries. Significant positive returns for the losing 
industry excess stock portfolio appear in the second, the third and the fifth year (i.e. in 
windows (13, 24), (25, 36) and (49, 60)). Furthermore, January and April have no material 
impact on these returns. The last two rows in Panel B show that the contrarian return between 
the two industry excess stock portfolios is significantly positive over the five-year period as 
well as in the second and fifth years. However, the significance level is slightly lower than 
that reported in Table 4. Overall, we conclude that past stock performance does not account 
for industry contrarian performance. 
4.4 Comparisons between the intra- and inter-industry reversals 
The outperformance of losing over winning industries in Section 4.1 indicates that long-term 
industry reversals are likely to be an inter-industry effect. However, several studies show that 
firm characteristics (e.g. size and value) relative to their industry average can predict stock 
returns (e.g. Bustamante, 2015; Cohen and Polk, 1996). This implies that under- or over-
performing stocks within the same industry may also drive reversals. In other words, 
reversals can be an intra-industry phenomenon. To investigate this view, we include the 
within-industry dummies (Ind 5year winner
within
 and Ind 5year loser
within
) jointly with inter-
industry dummies (5year winning Ind and 5year losing Ind) in the Fama-MacBeth 
regressions. Table 6 provides the results.   
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The results show that neither within-industry winners nor losers have any significant 
returns over the five-year period. In the first year after portfolio formation, within-industry 
winners and losers exhibit a momentum effect, with returns of 0.10% and -0.10% per month 
outside January and April (column (2)). Within-industry losers only have a positive return in 
the fourth year (i.e. window (37, 48)). However, the inter-industry variable 5year losing Ind 
shows that losing industries have significant returns over both the five-year period (i.e. 0.27% 
in column (11)) and most of the individual holding periods (i.e. columns (3) to (10)). The last 
four rows show the intra-industry contrarian spread and the inter-industry contrarian spread. 
The intra-industry contrarian spread is not statistically different from zero over the five-year 
period and is significantly negative in the first year, outside January and April (column (2)). 
In contrast, the inter-industry spread is significantly positive over the five-year period as well 
as from the second to the fifth year. The results in this section confirm that long-term industry 
reversals are an inter-industry effect.  
4.5 Are long-term industry reversals driven by risk or mispricing? 
4.5.1 Risk-adjusted returns 
This section examines whether stock and industry reversals are attributable to risk exposures. 
Each coefficient in the Fama-MacBeth regressions (Eq.(1)) is a time-series average of sums 
(e.g. 
7tS  and 8tS  in Section 2.3) of monthly raw returns to a particular portfolio strategy. We 
first estimate the risk-adjusted return on a particular strategy by running a time-series 
regression of the strategy’s sums on the Fama-French (1993) factor realizations16. We then 
report the intercepts (risk-adjusted returns) for the strategy in Table 7. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
Insert Table 7 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Panel A shows that neither winner nor loser stocks have significant returns over the 
five-year period. The economic magnitude of the loser stocks’ reversals is negligible (only 9 
basis points with a t-statistic of 1.42) (see column (11)). The stock contrarian performance is 
also insignificant in the five individual holding periods. However, the returns on losing 
industries and industry contrarian performance remain positively significant. Thus, although 
the cross-sectional analysis in Table 4 shows the co-existence of stock and industry reversals 
                                                          
16
 We are grateful to Gregory et al. (2013) for providing the UK Fama-French factors on their website,  
http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/files/ 
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in all calendar months, only industry reversals remain robust to the Fama-French three-factor 
adjustments.
17
  
Recent asset pricing studies (e.g. Novy-Marx, 2013; Fama and French, 2006, 2008; 
Titman et al., 2004) show that firm fundamentals, beyond those in the Fama and French 
(1996) model, predict stock returns. Building upon the discounted cash flow model, two 
additional fundamental factors, namely investment and profitability, are introduced to explain 
cross-sectional stock returns (Fama and French, 2015; Hou et al, 2015). To re-evaluate 
contrarian profits, we use the Fama and French five-factor model (Fama and French, 2015) to 
adjust contrarian returns. Panel B provides the results. 
The results show that the returns on both loser and winner stocks over the five-year 
period are not significant. Loser stocks have a significantly positive return only in the fourth 
year (column (7)), but this return becomes insignificant when January and April are excluded. 
The stock contrarian returns are statistically insignificant outside January and April and in 
most of the individual holding periods, except in columns (7) and (9). The five-factor 
adjusted returns of loser and winner stocks are nearly identical to those of the three-factor 
model (Panel A). Stocks from losing industries still have a significantly positive return over 
the five-year period at 0.24%, in column (11). Their returns are significantly positive from 
the third to the fifth year after portfolio formation. The last two rows show that the industry 
contrarian profits over the five-year period are positive (0.19% per month) and significant at 
the 10% level. When January and April are excluded, the profits drop slightly to 0.16% per 
month. The contrarian profits are also significant in three out of the five individual holding 
periods, albeit their magnitude is slightly smaller than those reported in the case of the three-
factor model.   
In untabulated results, we find that the loading on the value factor for the five-year 
industry contrarian spread is positive, while those on the size and market factors are negative 
in both the three- and five-factor models. This implies that, relative to a neutral portfolio, the 
industry contrarian portfolio has low market risk and tends to be heavily weighted towards 
big firms (which makes sense because large firms are the main contributors to industry 
                                                          
17 Our risk adjustments are the same as the procedure of Fama and French (1996). We first estimate the 
portfolios’ returns based on Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions, in which we use all sample stocks (not just 
winners or losers) and are able to hedge out the effect of size, momentum (e.g. from both stocks and industries), 
and bid-ask bounce (or monthly reversals) to isolate monthly returns attributable only to whether a stock 
belongs to stock- or industry-past performance portfolios. This first procedure ensures that the second one, 
which assesses the significance of risk-adjusted returns to the portfolios of interest, produces powerful tests.  
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performance) and value stocks (as losing industries’  market value has decreased and book-
to-market is large). In the five-factor model, the loadings on the investment and profitability 
factors are positive and negative, respectively. This suggests that industry contrarian profits 
come mainly from firms with low profitability (poor earnings may lead to poor performance) 
and those with fewer investment opportunities (firms in losing industries may find it difficult 
to expand their business). These findings suggest that industry contrarian returns are related 
to firms’ fundamentals18. 
However, does the above evidence mean that industry reversals are a risk premium? 
We argue that this may not necessarily be the case. First, even though one third of industry-
contrarian performance disappears (27 vs. 19 basis points) after controlling for the Fama and 
French five factors, the returns on losing industries remain significantly positive over the 
five-year period and the contrarian performance continues to be significant in some of the 
individual holding periods. This means that the mispricing explanation cannot be ruled out. 
Second, Fama and French (2015) note that, as investment and profitability are two elements 
in the discounted cash flow model, the return prediction is the same whether the price is 
rational or irrational. Therefore, the loadings on the investment and profitability factors 
cannot be interpreted directly as risk exposures. Hou et al. (2015, p. 34) made a similar 
argument in stating that “… we wish to emphasize that the q-factor model is silent about the 
debate between rational asset pricing and mispricing. This interpretation is somewhat weaker 
than the risk factors interpretation per Fama and French (1993, 1996).”  
4.5.2 Sharpe ratio analysis 
The reduction of industry reversals in the five-factor model would be consistent with the risk-
based explanation, if the five-factor model were a rational asset pricing model. However, the 
debate on whether the five-factor model captures risk or mispricing is still ongoing. 
Balakrishna et al. (2010) report that the level of profits after controlling for the unexpected 
change in earnings, predicts stock returns. Hirshleifer et al. (2011) provide a theoretical 
model in which profitability predicts returns because of investors’ imperfect rationality. In 
the mean-variance framework, MacKinlay (1995) argues that risk-based explanations of asset 
pricing anomalies are bounded by the plausibility of the (squared) Sharpe ratio of the 
                                                          
18
 We also undertake an event study approach to investigate whether time-varying betas and factor loadings can 
explain positive returns to industry losers (e.g. Ball and Kothari, 1989). Generally, we find that the loadings on 
the value and investment factors have significantly increased in the post-event period. However, even after 
controlling for the changes in the loadings, the industry losers still have significantly positive abnormal returns. 
These results are available upon request.  
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tangency portfolio that they imply. As such, the mean-variance efficient combination of the 
factors should have a Sharpe ratio greater than or equal to the maximum Sharpe ratio from 
anomalies. Table 8 reports Sharpe ratios for the three-factor model, the five-factor model, and 
the long-short contrarian portfolios. The monthly Sharpe ratio for each individual factor is 
calculated as the mean factor return divided by its standard deviation. Following MacKinlay 
(1995), we also estimate the maximum Sharpe ratio achievable from a given factor model as 
1' f f fV 
 , where f  is the vector of mean factor returns and fV  is the variance-covariance 
matrix of the factor returns.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Panel A shows that the value and investment factors in the five-factor model have 
the highest Sharpe ratios, of 0.10 and 0.25. The Sharpe ratio for five-year industry contrarian 
performance is 0.13, which is greater than that of the MKT, SMB and HML in the three-
factor model. However, the Sharpe ratio of the five-year stock contrarian performance is 
nearly the same as the HML factor (0.10). Panel B shows that the three-factor model 
produces a maximum Sharpe ratio (0.15) that is lower than that of the industry contrarian 
performance (0.25), but greater than that of the stock contrarian performance (0.13). The 
tangency portfolio implied by the three-factor model encompasses the maximum risk-reward 
trade-off generated by stock contrarian performance, which is consistent with the risk-based 
explanation. In contrast, industry contrarian performance is likely to be as result of the 
mispricing effect in the three-factor-based risk-return world. The Sharpe ratios of the stock- 
and industry-contrarian performance and the three-factor model are all significant at the 5% 
level or lower
19
. For the five-factor model, the maximum achievable Sharpe ratio is 0.29, 
which is greater than the Sharpe ratio associated with the industry contrarian performance 
and the three-factor model. Consistent with the previous results, the five-factor model is 
possibly more effective in explaining industry contrarian performance than its three-factor 
counterpart. However, the profitability and investment factors in the five-factor model do not 
necessarily represent risk (Fama and French, 2015; Hou et al., 2015). This is because 
comovement of stocks with similar profitability or investment opportunities does not 
contradict the mispricing effect. For instance, if investors have similar bias in processing 
                                                          
19
 Under the null hypothesis that the factor risk premiums are jointly equal to zero, [(T-N)/N]SSR is distributed 
as a central F(N, T-N), where N is the number of portfolios, T is the number of time-series observations and 
SSR is the squared Sharpe ratio (for details, see MacKinlay (1995) and Brennan et al. (1998)).  
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earnings information, as modelled by Hirshleifer et al. (2011), returns on stocks with similar 
profitability will also comove. Hence, both investors’ imperfect rationality and firm 
fundamentals can jointly generate the predictive power of profitability for returns. 
Furthermore, MacKinlay (1995) argues that the maximum Sharpe ratio for the Fama-French 
three-factor model is too high to be consistent with rational asset pricing. We show that the 
maximum Sharpe ratio of the five-factor model (0.2981) is even higher. This implies that the 
five-factor model may capture some elements of mispricing in stock returns
20
 and therefore 
we cannot fully rule out the mispricing effect in the industry contrarian performance. 
 4.5.3 State of the economy  
Our previous results show that, although fundamental-related risks have explained some 
portion of industry contrarian performance, a considerable proportion of the positive returns 
on losing industries are left unexplained. This evidence suggests that there is still a possibility 
that a mispricing effect contributes towards industry reversals. To investigate this issue, we 
undertake a nonparametric approach similar to that of Lakonishok et al. (1994). The risk-
based argument says that, if losing industries are riskier than winning industries, the former 
should outperform the latter particularly in good states of the economy. However, there 
should be no contrarian performance in bad states of the economy, in which the marginal 
utility of wealth is high, making the risky losing industries unattractive to risk-averse 
investors. To test this prediction, we examine the consistency of the performance of the 
industry contrarian strategies across different states of the economy. The profits of these 
strategies are estimated from Eq.(1).  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The first approach examines industry contrarian performance during extremely bad 
times. Our sample period includes three waves of UK economic recessions, which are 
defined as negative GDP growth in two consecutive quarters as reported by the Office of 
National Statistics (ONS). We define the rest of the sample period as “other times”. Panel A 
of Table 9 reports the results. In the first two waves of recessions (1980: Q1 to 1981: Q2 and 
                                                          
20
The maximum Sharpe ratios for the three- and four-factor models are 0.21 and 0.41 in US markets, as reported 
by Hou et al. (2015). The four-factor model is based on the q-theory without the value factor. Hou et al. (2015) 
argue that the value effect is captured by the profitability and investment factors. We find that the value factor 
plays an important role in explaining industry-contrarian performance. Without the value factor in the five-
factor model, industry-contrarian profits are significantly positive at the 5% level. Hou et al. (2015) argue that 
the maximum Sharpe ratio for their four-factor model is not too high (0.41) compared with the maximum 
Sharpe ratio of 1.6, which is estimated by factors containing 28 anomalies. 
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1991: Q1 to 1991: Q4), losing and winning industries have very similar performance. The 
difference between the two portfolios’ returns is insignificant. However, in the most recent 
recession (2008: Q2 to 2009: Q3), losing industries have significantly higher returns than 
winning industries. This result indicates that the industry contrarian strategy is still profitable 
in recession times, inconsistent with the risk-based explanation. Following Lakonishok et al. 
(1994), we also evaluate the industry contrarian performance across four states of the 
economy, according to the overall market performance, using the equally weighted market 
return
21
. The four states are the 25 worst stock return months, the remaining 149 negative 
return months, the 184 positive months other than the 25 best, and the best 25 months in the 
sample. Panel B provides the results. The first two columns show that industry contrarian 
strategies are profitable when the overall market experiences the worst and best performance. 
The evidence that industry contrarian performance also happens in bad states of the economy 
contradicts the risk-based explanation, suggesting that losing industries are not riskier than 
winning industries.  
4.5.4 Valuation uncertainty  
Previous studies show that stocks with a great amount of valuation uncertainty, which makes 
arbitrage risky, costly and limited, are likely to be mispriced (e.g. Merton, 1987; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Lam and Wei, 2011). The uncertainty can rise from a poor information 
environment, which can be a barrier to fair valuation of the firm by investors. Thus, if long-
term industry reversals are due to mispricing, the reversals should be more pronounced for 
stocks within industries with high informational opacity. We use four proxies for valuation 
uncertainty, namely accruals, idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), competitiveness and analyst 
coverage.  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Accruals form important accounting information which should be used by investors 
to adjust operating cash flows and earnings. Hirshleifer et al. (2012) and Sloan (1996) find 
that investors have limited resources to incorporate accruals into the share valuation process. 
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) show that industry-based accruals can also predict future returns for 
industry portfolios, implying that accruals can be a barrier to the proper valuation of 
industries. We define accruals in the same way as Sloan (1996). Each of the accrual elements 
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 Note that using real GDP growth, instead of the overall market performance, to define the states of the 
economy does not affect our conclusions. Further details of these results are available upon request.  
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is aggregated at the industry level and then we calculate the industry accrual ratio
22
. 
Industries are ranked by their accrual ratios in June of each year. The median accrual ratio is 
used to define high and low accrual industries from July of this year to June of next year. 
Then, we repeat the Fama-MacBeth regressions (Eq.(1)) for stocks in high and low accrual 
industries. If industry contrarian performance is due to a mispricing effect, we expect 
industry reversals to be more pronounced in industries with high accruals. Panel A of Table 
10 reports the average monthly returns across the entire five-year period (i.e. (1, 60)). It 
shows that the industry contrarian strategy is profitable only in high accrual industries, 
consistent with the mispricing explanation for the industry reversals.  
IVOL is also widely used as a proxy for informational opacity. Krishnaswami and 
Subramaniam (1999) use IVOL as a measure of information asymmetry between firm 
insiders and outsiders. West (1988) and Kelly (2014) document a negative association 
between price informativeness and IVOL. In the context of industries, industry IVOL would 
indicate how well industry portfolios absorbed industry and market relevant information. 
Boutchkova et al. (2012) show that the sensitivity of an industry’s returns to political events 
can be a function of its IVOL. More recent studies show that IVOL is also a salient 
characteristic for short-sell constraints and risky arbitrage (Stambaugh et al., 2015; 
Mashruwala et al., 2006; Lam and Wei, 2011). We argue that, if industry contrarian 
performance is driven by the mispricing effect, this effect should be stronger in industries 
with high IVOL. To estimate industry level IVOL, we construct daily value weighted returns 
for the 20 industries. Industry IVOL is the standard deviation of the residuals obtained by 
regressing daily industry portfolio returns on the daily FTSE All Share Index return from July 
of the previous year to June of the current year. The 20 industries are then ranked by their 
IVOL, and the top (bottom) 10 industries are defined as high (low) IVOL industries from July 
of this year to June of the next. The sample stocks are separated into those in high and low 
IVOL industries for the running of the Fama-MacBeth regressions (Eq.(1)). Panel B shows 
that the industry contrarian strategy is profitable only in high IVOL industries, consistent 
with the mispricing effect.  
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The accruals are defined as ( )industryACC CA CL Cash STDEBT DEP       (Sloan, 1996), where 
CA =change in current assets during period t; CL =change in current liabilities during period t; Cash =the 
change in cash and cash equivalents during period t; STDEBT =the change in the current maturities of long-
term debt and other short-term debt included in current liabilities during period t; and DEP =depreciation and 
amortization expenses during period t. 
industryACC  is divided by an industry’s lagged total assets to obtain the 
accrual ratio. The aggregated elements at the industry level reflect the value-weighted accruals. We also use the 
equally weighted approach to calculate industry-based accruals and our results remain quantitatively the same. 
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Competition across industries provides another important informational channel for 
investors to value stocks. Because firms in more concentrated industries can exercise 
significant pricing power on their products, they tend to disclose less information to the 
public, obscuring the fair value of stocks (e.g. Gal-Or, 1985; Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Ali 
et al., 2014). On the other hand, firms in more competitive industries can attract a great 
amount of attention from investors, who will demand more information from analysts (e.g. 
Kross et al., 1990; Lys and Soo, 1995; Das et al., 1998; Barth et al., 2001). As such, firms 
have more incentives to supply information to analysts in more competitive industries. Thus, 
the mispricing effect would predict a higher industry contrarian spread in more concentrated 
industries. We measure industry concentration using the Herfindahl index
23
. Specifically, we 
calculate the Herfindahl index according to the last year’s financial reports for the 20 
industries. The top (bottom) 10 industries are defined as highly (less) concentrated industries 
from July of this year to June of the next. Then, we run the Fama-MacBeth regressions for 
the highly and less concentrated industries separately. The results in Panel C suggest that, in 
highly concentrated industries, losing industry not only earn a positive return of 0.32% per 
month, but also significantly outperform winning industries by 0.30% per month. However, 
the industry contrarian spread disappears in less concentrated industries. This evidence is 
consistent with the notion that industry competition improves stock price adjustments to 
information.  
Our final proxy for informational opacity is the number of analysts following. The 
role of financial analysts in disseminating information in financial markets has been widely 
documented (e.g. Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Admati, 1985; Bhushan, 1989). Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004) and Chan and Hameed (2006) report that analyst activities help impound 
both industry and market relevant information into stock prices. This implies that industry 
contrarian performance should be weaker in industries followed by more analysts. We collect 
the number of analysts following each firm in June of each year. According to each stock’s 
industry membership, the number of analysts is aggregated in a given industry and then 
divided by the total number of firms in the industry
24
. We define the top (bottom) 10 
                                                          
23
 The Herfindahl index is defined as 
2
1
I
j ij
i
Herfindahl S

 , where ijS  is the market share of firm i in industry j 
in terms of net sales in each sample year. 
24
 The data for analyst coverage is extracted from the Bloomberg database. The sample period is from 1997 to 
2011. We also use the aggregated number of analysts at the industry level to define high and low analyst 
coverage industries. The results are similar to those produced when using the number of analysts per firm in a 
given industry.  
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industries as high (low) analyst coverage industries from July of this year to June of the next. 
We run the Fama-MacBeth regressions for the high and low analyst coverage industries 
separately. Panel D shows that, in high analyst coverage industries, industry contrarian 
performance is virtually zero. However, in low analyst coverage industries, losing industries 
significantly outperform winning industries. These findings highlight the role of financial 
analysts in improving information dissemination and are also consistent with the mispricing 
explanation of industry contrarian performance.  
 Overall, we show that the contrarian spreads are only significant in industries with 
high valuation uncertainty and these findings are robust to various risk-adjustment techniques 
and are not affected by the seasonal patterns.   
5. Conclusions 
This study investigates the role of past industry performance in driving long-term return 
reversals in the UK market. We find a strong industry influence on stock return reversals 
when we condition industry returns on past performance. We also find that firms in losing 
industries significantly outperform those in winning industries over the subsequent five years. 
These industry reversals remain strong and persistent after controlling for stock and industry 
momentum, seasonal effects and traditional risk factors. We also compare these industry 
reversals with the stock reversals generated from individual stocks’ past performance. We 
find that stock reversals come exclusively in January and April, consistent with the tax loss 
selling hypothesis. However, the absence of seasonal patterns in industry reversals does not 
support the tax-based explanation. Further analysis suggests that past industry performance is 
the main determinant of stock reversals. However, past stock performance cannot explain 
industry reversals. The overall results suggest that past industry performance contains salient 
information about long-term stock returns. Next, we investigate whether industry reversals 
are driven by risk or are a result of mispricing. In contrast to the risk-based explanation, we 
show that industry contrarian performance appears in both good and bad states of the 
economy. Consistent with the mispricing view, we also find that industry contrarian 
performance is greater in industries with high valuation uncertainty.    
Our results have several important implications. First, we show that industries play 
an important role in conditional asset pricing. Specifically, while previous studies show that 
contemporaneous industry returns have a negligible impact on stock returns (e.g., Fama and 
French, 1997; Heston and Rouwenhorst, 1994; Griffin and Karolyi, 1998), we find past 
industry performance to affect future stock returns. Second, we contribute to the debate on 
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the causes of contrarian profits by showing that industry reversals are the main determinant of 
stock reversals and are more likely to represent mispricing than risk. Finally, our results 
suggest that investors are better off exploiting contrarian strategies by focusing on past 
industry performance. 
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Table 1 Description and summary statistics of industry 
The table reports basic characteristics of the 20 super-sector based industry portfolios according to the 
International Classification of Benchmarks (ICB). The 20 industries are formed monthly from January 1975 to 
December 2011. The average number of stocks included in each industry is reported. The average percentage of 
total market capitalisations, five-year raw returns, and five-year excess market returns are the time-series means 
of cross-sectional industry averages in each month. Five-year raw returns are calculated from five-year value-
weighted industry return indexes and five-year excess market returns are calculated from five-year industries’ 
raw returns minus five-year FTSE All Share market index returns. The last row average is reported the times 
series means for the statistics across 20 industries in each month.  
Industry 
code Industry Name
Avg. No. 
of Stocks
Avg. % of 
Market Cap.
5-year Raw 
Return
5-year Excess 
Market Return
1 Oil & Gas 43 8.48% 0.7220 0.1594
2 Chemicals 40 3.21% 0.5103 -0.0512
3 Basic Resources 51 2.99% 0.5454 -0.0200
4 Constructions & Materials 54 2.18% 0.4859 -0.0748
5 Industrial Goods & Services 364 7.68% 0.1853 -0.3768
6 Automibles & Parts 6 0.79% 0.0924 -0.4699
7 Food & Beverage 70 5.07% 0.6780 0.1169
8 Personal & Household Goods 138 3.58% 0.7781 0.2163
9 Health Care 50 5.27% 0.9026 0.3389
10 Retail 137 5.56% 0.5772 0.0155
11 Media 86 4.12% 0.4488 -0.1123
12 Travel & Leisure 90 2.65% 0.4998 -0.0622
13 Telecommuincations 18 6.67% 1.2969 0.7309
14 Utilities 31 4.14% 0.5856 0.2063
15 Banks 26 20.03% 0.4146 -0.1467
16 Insurance 38 8.77% 0.5106 -0.0505
17 Financial Services 90 2.31% 0.6368 0.0738
18 Technology 83 0.99% 0.2801 -0.2832
19 Real Estate 95 1.92% 0.5202 -0.0425
20 Others 96 3.50% 0.2414 -0.4879
Average 98 6.70% 0.5418 -0.0135
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Table 2 Correlation matrix for long term reversal variables 
The table is a correlation matrix for long term reversal variables and reports time-series means of cross-sectional correlations in each month. The variables in the matrix are various 
winner and loser identities according to individual stock and industry past performance and their interactions. 5-year winner (5-year loser) is a long term stock performance dummy 
that takes the value of 1 if a stock i’s past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t, and zero otherwise. 5-year winning Ind. (5-year losing Ind.) is a 
dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and losing industry in month t, and zero otherwise. Long term winning and losing industry are defined as 
the top and bottom three industries ranked on five-year value-weighted average industry returns. 5  Excessyear Winner ( 5  Excessyear Loser ) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if a stock i’s industry adjusted five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t, and zero otherwise. The industry adjusted five-year return is calculated 
as the stock’s own five-year return minus the value-weighed five-year return for the industry to which the stock belongs. Conversely, we re-define winning and losing industries in 
terms of excess stock returns. All stocks are first placed into quintile portfolios according to the stock five-year performance measure. The excess stock return is a stock’s five-year 
return minus the value-weighted five-year return of the quintile portfolio to which the stock belongs. For each o industry, we then average the excess stock returns according to each 
stock’s industry membership. We choose top and bottom 3 portfolios as new winning and losing industries based on each industry’s excess stock returns. If a stock belongs to the 
winning (losing) industries, the dummy 5  Excessyear winningInd  ( 5  Excessyear losing Ind ) is equal to one, and zero otherwise. Ind 5year winnerwithin and Ind 5year loserwithin are long 
term within-industry winners and losers according to an individual stock’s five-year return ranking within its industry. All sample stocks are ranked by their five-year returns within 
each industry in terms of their industry memberships. The top (bottom) 30% of stocks in a given industry is labelled as within-industry winners (losers). 
 
5-year 
winner 5-year loser
 5-year 
winning Ind
 5-year losing 
Ind
5-year 
winner
Excess
5-year 
loser
Excess
5year winning 
Ind
Excess
5year losing 
Ind
Excess
Ind.5year 
winner
within
Ind.5year 
loser
within
5-year winner 1
5-year loser -0.4279 1
5-year winning Ind 0.1754 -0.1467 1
5-year losing Ind -0.1743 0.1651 -0.1845 1
5-year winner
Excess
0.7932 -0.4272 -0.1437 0.0505 1
5-year loser
Excess
-0.4202 0.7229 0.1329 -0.2312 -0.4282 1
5year winning Ind
Excess
0.1059 -0.1245 0.0977 -0.1158 0.1238 -0.0343 1
5year losing Ind
Excess
-0.1130 0.1268 -0.0815 0.1736 -0.1179 0.0539 -0.1278 1
Ind.5year winner
within
0.7909 -0.0550 -0.0129 0.0054 0.3020 -0.2908 -0.0779 0.0847 1
Ind.5year loser
within
-0.0559 0.7862 -0.0108 0.0063 -0.2866 0.2952 0.1523 -0.0843 -0.2933 1  
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Table 3 Identifying industry reversals  
We estimate 60 ( 1,...,60)j   cross-sectional regressions on a monthly basis between February 1980 and December 2011 as following 
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10 , 11
52 52
5 5 5
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser
b yearWinner b yearLoser b yearWinningInd b
      
  
       
    ,5yearjt i t j ijtLosingInd e 
 
itR is the return to stock i  in month t. , 1i tR  , , 1i tsize   and , 1i tBM  are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the 
month t-1 cross-sectional mean.  52wkhWinneri,t-j(52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of 1 if the 52-week high measure for stock i is 
ranked in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in month t-j-12 to t-j. 
IndMomWinneri,t-j (IndMomLoseri,t-j) is an industry momentum dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in month t-j. Short 
term winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom three industries ranked on value-weighted 12-month industry average returns. 5-year winner (5-year loser) is a 
dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i’s past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t, and zero otherwise. 5-year winningIndi,t-j (5-year 
losing Indi,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and  losing industry in month t-j. Long term winning and losing industry are defined as 
the top and bottom three industries ranked on value-weighted five-year average industry returns. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are average over 
1,2,...,12j  for column labelled (1, 12), 13,14,...,24j  for column (13, 24)… and 1,2,...,60j  for columns labelled (1, 60). The numbers reported in the table are the time series 
averages of these averages in percentage per month. Time series average numbers of observations for each month based on cross-sectional regressions are reported in the last row. 
Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Monthly 
return 
(1,12)
Monthly 
return (1,12) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(13,24)
Monthly 
return (13,24) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(25,36)
Monthly 
return (25,36) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(37,48)
Monthly 
return 
(37,48) Jan & 
Apr Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(49,60)
Monthly 
return (49,60) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(1,60)
Monthly 
return (1,60) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Intercept 0.78 0.54 0.68 0.45 0.70 0.49 0.75 0.41 0.78 0.46 0.73 0.47
(2.94) (2.54) (3.54) (1.96) (2.91) (1.95) (2.76) (1.88) (2.89) (1.78) (2.94) (1.82)
R i,t-1 -1.21 -0.83 -1.18 -0.97 -1.27 -1.00 -1.05 -0.79 -1.10 -0.73 -1.16 -0.87
(-2.69) (-1.89) (-2.54) (-2.47) (-2.76) (-2.17) (-2.43) (-1.83) (-2.69) (-2.54) (-3.49) (-2.67)
Size i,t-1 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
(-1.66) (-1.67) (-2.23) (-1.79) (-2.18) (-1.78) (-1.88) (-1.60) (-2.20) (-1.87) (-2.52) (-2.00)
BM i,t-1 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.26 0.30 0.26 0.29 0.27 0.30
(5.94) (5.79) (5.88) (5.72) (5.73) (5.58) (5.37) (5.25) (5.22) (5.09) (5.65) (5.51)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Monthly 
return 
(1,12)
Monthly 
return (1,12) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(13,24)
Monthly 
return 
(13,24) Jan 
& Apr Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(25,36)
Monthly 
return 
(25,36) Jan 
& Apr Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(37,48)
Monthly 
return 
(37,48) Jan 
& Apr Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(49,60)
Monthly 
return 
(49,60) Jan 
& Apr Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(1,60)
Monthly 
return (1,60) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
52week high winner 0.46 0.54 0.03 0.10 -0.00 0.05 0.04 0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.15
(5.94) (7.17) (0.74) (2.00) (-0.10) (1.25) (1.39) (2.58) (-0.61) (0.23) (3.51) (3.16)
52week high loser -1.05 -1.16 -0.27 -0.43 -0.26 -0.36 -0.25 -0.31 -0.16 -0.20 -0.39 -0.49
(-7.68) (-8.71) (-3.11) (-4.60) (-3.22) (-4.27) (-3.57) (-4.03) (-2.49) (-2.89) (-5.57) (-6.72)
Ind_mom_winner 0.15 0.05 -0.00 0.05 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06 -0.03 0.03 0.07 -0.03 0.02
(1.93) (0.75) (-0.13) (0.49) (-1.38) (-0.80) (-0.77) (-0.39) (0.29) (0.59) (-0.57) (0.23)
Ind_mom_loser -0.18 -0.14 0.07 0.05 -0.11 -0.10 -0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.05 -0.03
(-2.00) (-1.44) (0.91) (0.52) (-1.47) (-1.19) (-0.07) (0.30) (-0.09) (0.31) (-1.04) (-0.57)
5-year winner -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(-0.79) (0.43) (-0.25) (0.13) (-0.44) (-0.19) (0.15) (0.47) (-1.22) (-0.40) (-0.40) (0.15)
5-year loser 0.07 -0.07 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.04
(0.79) (-0.89) (1.80) (0.29) (1.83) (0.96) (2.24) (1.34) (1.59) (0.93) (2.07) (0.78)
5-year winning Ind -0.09 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.09 -0.13 -0.12 -0.02 0.02
(-0.88) (0.13) (-0.98) (-1.00) (1.01) (0.95) (0.76) (0.80) (-1.29) (-1.21) (-0.09) (0.26)
5-year losing Ind 0.06 0.08 0.17 0.22 0.32 0.32 0.37 0.40 0.45 0.49 0.27 0.30
(0.71) (0.89) (1.88) (2.20) (3.43) (3.33) (3.91) (3.79) (4.30) (4.26) (3.86) (3.90)
5-year loser- 0.10 -0.10 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.04
5-year winner (1.24) (-0.94) (1.68) (0.15) (1.76) (0.88) (1.90) (0.98) (1.47) (0.95) (1.96) (0.56)
5-year losing Ind- 0.15 0.07 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.57 0.60 0.29 0.29
5-year winning Ind (1.42) (0.48) (1.75) (1.85) (2.01) (1.99) (2.45) (2.50) (3.81) (3.56) (2.69) (2.51)
Avg. obs 1439 1330 1269 1204 1137 1265   
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Table 4 Nesting comparisons between stock and industry reversals 
We estimate 60 ( 1,...,60)j   cross-sectional regressions on a monthly basis between February 1980 and December 2011 as following for Panel A 
,
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10
52 52
5 5 5
i t j
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
Stock
jt i t j jt i t j jt l
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser
b yearWinner b yearLoser b Neutral year

      
 
       
   
,, 11 ,
5
i t j
stock
i t j jt i t j ijtWinningInd b Neutral yearLosingInd e   
 
The following equation is estimated for Panel B 
,
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 ,
9 , 10
52 52 5
5
i t j
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
indu
jt i t j jt
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser b yearWinningInd
b yearLosingInd b Neutral

       

        
  , 11 , ,5 5
stry industry
i t j jt i t j i t j ijtyearWinnner b Neutral yearLoser e     
 
itR is the return to stock i  in month t. , 1i tR  , , 1i tBM  and , 1i tsize   are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the 
month t-1 cross-sectional mean.  52wkhWinneri,t-j (52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is 
ranked in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in 
month t-j-12 to t-j. IndMomWinneri,t-j(IndMomLoseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in month t-j, and zero 
otherwise. Short term winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom 3 industries ranked on 12-month value-weighted average industry returns. 5-year winneri,t-j (5-
year loseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i’s past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. ,
stock
i t jNeutral   is 
a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a stock i is neither five-year losers nor five-year winners in month t-j, and zero otherwise. ,
industry
i t jNeutral  is a dummy variable that 
takes value of one if a stock i belongs to neither winning  nor losing industries according to five-year value-weighted industry returns, and zero otherwise. 5-year winning Indi,t-j ( 5-
year losing Indi,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and  losing industry in month t-j, and zero otherwise.  Long-term winning and 
losing industry are defined as the top and bottom three industries ranked on five-year value-weighted average industry returns. The coefficient diffidence between 
11 10jt jtb b in Panel 
A can be interpreted as industry contrarian returns with neutral stock performance.  The coefficient diffidence between 
11 10jt jtb b in Panel B can be interpreted as stock contrarian 
returns with neutral industry performance. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are average over 1,2,...,12j  for column labelled (1, 12), 13,14,...,24j  for 
column (13, 24)… and 1,2,...,60j  for columns labelled (1, 60). The numbers reported in the table are the time series averages of these averages in percentage per month. Newey-
West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients on control variables are omitted for brevity.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Monthly 
return 
(1,12)
Monthly 
return 
(1,12) Jan 
& Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(13,24)
Monthly 
return 
(13,24) Jan 
& Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(25,36)
Monthly 
return 
(25,36) Jan 
& Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(37,48)
Monthly 
return 
(37,48) Jan 
& Apr 
Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(49,60)
Monthly 
return 
(49,60) Jan 
& Apr 
Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(1,60)
Monthly 
return 
(1,60) Jan 
& Apr 
Excl.
5-year winner 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.09 -0.09 0.00 0.04
(0.56) (0.78) (0.58) (1.01) (0.72) (0.71) (0.56) (0.93) (-1.53) (-1.43) (0.08) (0.74)
5-year loser 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.17 0.11 0.05 -0.02 0.11 0.06
(1.61) (0.18) (1.65) (0.81) (1.44) (0.93) (2.35) (1.34) (0.08) (-0.26) (1.90) (1.03)
Neutral
stock
* -0.00 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.07 -0.22 -0.21 -0.03 0.00
5year Winning Ind (-0.04) (0.83) (-0.07) (0.14) (0.41) (0.22) (0.51) (0.52) (-1.77) (-1.48) (-0.17) (0.40)
Neutral
stock
* 0.11 0.18 0.17 0.22 0.31 0.28 0.37 0.42 0.36 0.39 0.26 0.30
5year Losing Ind (1.25) (1.97) (1.76) (2.20) (3.17) (2.63) (3.64) (3.66) (3.57) (3.45) (3.75) (3.87)
5year losing Ind- 5year winning Ind 0.11 0.08 0.17 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.31 0.34 0.58 0.60 0.29 0.30
 amg Neutral
stock
(0.82) (0.60) (1.52) (1.75) (1.95) (1.73) (2.03) (2.25) (3.98) (3.96) (2.08) (2.05)
5year winning Ind -0.11 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.12 -0.14 -0.14 -0.01 0.02
(-1.03) (0.07) (-0.42) (-0.16) (1.42) (1.30) (1.12) (1.17) (-1.39) (-1.16) (-0.08) (0.31)
5year losing Ind 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.19 0.31 0.32 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.47 0.27 0.29
(0.38) (0.46) (1.59) (1.82) (3.12) (2.90) (3.96) (3.89) (4.14) (4.00) (3.54) (3.53)
Neutral
industry
* 0.02 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.10 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.06
5-year winner (0.34) (1.51) (0.27) (0.59) (1.11) (1.15) (1.46) (1.60) (-0.52) (-0.44) (0.68) (1.20)
Neutral
industry
* -0.03 -0.10 0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.13 0.11 0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.03
5-year loser (-0.30) (-1.49) (0.34) (0.59) (0.15) (-0.68) (1.68) (1.36) (0.24) (-0.24) (0.44) (-0.43)
5-year loser-5-year winner -0.05 -0.18 0.01 -0.08 -0.06 -0.13 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.01 -0.00 -0.09
 amg Neutral
industry
(-0.42) (-1.85) (0.11) (-0.70) (-0.78) (-1.24) (0.55) (0.09) (0.32) (0.07) (-0.04) (-1.08)
Panel B
Panel A
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Table 5 Adjusting for past performance 
We estimate 60 ( 1,...,60)j   cross-sectional regressions on a monthly basis between February 1980 and December 2011 as following for Panel A 
,
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10
52 52
5 5 5
i t j
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
jt i t j jt i t j jt
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser
b yearWinningInd b yearLosingInd b yearWinner

      
 
       
  
,11
5
i t j
Excess Excess
jt ijtb yearLoser e 
  
The following equation is estimated for Panel B. 
,
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10
52 52
5 5 5
i t j
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
Exc
jt i t j jt i t j jt
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser
b yearWinner b yearLoser b yearWinnningInd

      
 
       
  
,11
5
i t j
ess Excess
jt ijtb yearLosingInd e 
 
itR is the return to stock i  in month t. , 1i tR  , , 1i tBM  and , 1i tsize   are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the 
month t-1 cross-sectional mean. 52wkhWinneri,t-j(52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is 
ranked in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in 
month t-j-12 to t-j. IndMomWinneri,t-j (IndMomLoseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in month t-j, and zero 
otherwise. Short term winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom three industries ranked on 12-month value-weighted average industry returns.  5-year winneri,t-j 
(5-year loseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i’s past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. Ind. 5-year 
winneri,t-j (Ind. 5-year loseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and  losing industry in month t-j, and zero otherwise. Long term 
winning and losing industry are defined as the top and bottom three industries ranked on five-year value-weighted average industry returns.  ,5  
Excess
i t jyear Winner  ( ,5  
Excess
i t jyear Loser  ) 
is a dummy variable that takes value of one if a stock i’s industry adjusted five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The 
industry adjusted five-year return is calculated as the stock’s own five-year return minus the value-weighed five-year return for the industry to which the stock belongs. Conversely, 
we re-define winning and losing industries in terms of an excess stock return. All stocks are first placed into quintile portfolios according to the stock five-year performance measure. 
The excess stock return is a stock’s five-year return minus the value-weighted five-year return of the quintile portfolio to which the stock belongs. For each industry, we then average 
the excess stock returns according to each stock’s industry membership. We choose top and bottom three portfolios as new winning and losing industries based on each industry’s 
excess stock returns. If a stock belongs to the new winning (losing) industries, the dummy ,5  
Excess
i t jyear winningInd   ( ,5  
Excess
i t jyear losingInd  ) is equal to one in month t-j, and zero 
otherwise. The coefficient diffidence between 
11 10jt jtb b in Panel A can be interpreted as stock contrarian returns in excess of past industry performance. The coefficient diffidence 
between 
11 10jt jtb b in Panel B can be interpreted as industry contrarian returns in excess of past stock performance. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are 
average over 1,2,...,12j  for column labelled (1, 12), 13,14,...,24j  for column (13, 24)… and 1,2,...,60j  for columns labelled (1, 60). The numbers reported in the table are 
the time series averages of these averages in percentage per month. Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients on control variables are omitted 
for brevity.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Monthly 
return 
(1,12)
Monthly 
return 
(1,12) Jan 
& Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(13,24)
Monthly 
return 
(13,24) Jan 
& Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(25,36)
Monthly 
return 
(25,36) Jan 
& Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(37,48)
Monthly 
return 
(37,48) Jan 
& Apr 
Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(49,60)
Monthly 
return 
(49,60) Jan 
& Apr 
Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(1,60)
Monthly 
return 
(1,60) Jan 
& Apr 
Excl.
5-year winning Ind -0.06 0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 -0.10 -0.10 0.01 0.05
(-0.60) (0.64) (-0.09) (0.27) (1.21) (1.19) (0.83) (0.84) (-1.20) (-0.99) (0.17) (0.62)
5-year losing Ind 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.20 0.31 0.32 0.37 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.26 0.29
(0.45) 0.37) (1.68) (1.92) (3.30) (3.13) (4.01) (3.89) (4.30) (4.18) (3.70) (3.66)
5-year winner
Excess
0.05 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.05
(1.05) (1.60) (0.50) (0.63) (0.60) (0.74) (1.02) (1.44) (-0.82) (-0.68) (0.62) (1.05)
5-year loser
Excess
0.04 -0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.02
(0.47) (-0.89) (0.56) (-0.23) (0.22) (0.06) (1.96) (1.61) (0.35) (0.02) (1.01) (0.26)
5-year loser
Excess
- -0.02 -0.15 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03 -0.03
5-year winner
Excess
(-0.20) (-1.75) (0.11) (-0.58) (-0.24) (-0.46) (1.33) (1.02) (0.82) (0.48) (0.42) (-0.48)
5-year winner 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.00 0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.00 0.02
(0.17) (1.52) (0.14) (0.50) (0.14) (0.36) (-0.08) (0.38) (-1.16) (-1.05) (-0.16) (0.08)
5-year loser -0.00 -0.14 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.08 0.02
(-0.01) (-1.53) (1.04) (0.10) (1.33) (0.75) (1.96) (1.60) (2.06) (1.41) (1.68) (0.49)
5year winning Ind
Excess
-0.07 -0.06 -0.12 -0.15 -0.06 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.18 -0.14 -0.09 -0.08
(-0.67) (-0.41) (-1.09) (-1.14) (-0.42) (-0.44) (-0.57) (-0.54) (-1.53) (-1.14) (-0.88) (-0.75)
5year losing Ind
Excess
0.12 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.19
(1.33) (1.17) (1.49) (1.66) (1.83) (1.81) (1.11) (1.42) (2.01) (2.16) (2.29) (2.40)
5year losing Ind
Excess
- 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.33 0.23 0.25 0.18 0.23 0.35 0.36 0.25 0.27
5year winning Ind
Excess
(1.25) (1.03) (1.66) (1.77) (1.29) (1.28) (1.01) (1.14) (2.53) (2.07) (1.93) (1.84)
Panel A
Panel B
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Table 6 Comparisons between within industry and inter-industry reversals 
We estimate 60 ( 1,...,60)j   cross-sectional regressions on a monthly basis between February 1980 and December 2011  
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 , 9 , 10
52 52
5 5 5
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
within within
jt i t j jt i t j jt
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser
b Ind yearWinner b Ind yearLoser b yearW
      
 
       
   , 11 ,5i t j jt i t j ijtinningInd b yearLosingInd e  
 
itR is the return to stock i  in month t. , 1i tR  , , 1i tBM  and , 1i tsize   are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the 
month t-1 cross-sectional mean. 52wkhWinneri,t-j(52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is 
ranked in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in 
month t-j-12 to t-j. IndMomWinneri,t-j(IndMomLoseri,t-j) is an industry momentum dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in 
month t-j, and zero otherwise. Short term winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom three industries ranked on 12-month value-weighted average industry returns 
among 18 industries.  5-year winning Indi,t-j ( 5-year losing Indi,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and  losing industry in month t-j, 
and zero otherwise. Long term winning and losing industry are defined as the top and bottom three industries ranked on five-year value-weighted average industry returns, 
respectively. Ind 5year winner
within
 and Ind 5year loser
within
 are two within-industry winners and losers. All sample stocks are sorted on their past five-year performance within 
industries according to their industry memberships. For a given industry, the top (bottom) 30% of stocks are defined as within-industry winners and losers. The within-industry 
contrarian performance is measured by the coefficient difference of (
9 8jt jtb b ). The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are average over 1,2,...,12j  for column 
labelled (1, 12), 13,14,...,24j  for column (13, 24)… and 1,2,...,60j  for columns labelled (1, 60). The numbers in the table are in percentage per month. Newey-West (1987) 
adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Coefficients on control variables are omitted for brevity.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Monthly 
return 
(1,12)
Monthly 
return (1,12) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(13,24)
Monthly 
return 
(13,24) Jan 
& Apr Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(25,36)
Monthly 
return 
(25,36) Jan 
& Apr Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(37,48)
Monthly 
return (37,48) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(49,60)
Monthly 
return 
(49,60) Jan 
& Apr Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(1,60)
Monthly 
return (1,60) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Ind 5year winner
within
0.05 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.09 -0.00 -0.00 0.04 0.06
(1.07) (1.89) (0.81) (0.81) (0.98) (1.07) (1.54) (1.63) (-0.16) (-0.08) (1.08) (1.41)
Ind 5year loser
within
-0.00 -0.10 -0.00 -0.06 -0.00 -0.01 0.11 0.12 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.02
(-0.10) (-1.68) (-0.09) (-0.80) (-0.13) (-0.09) (1.88) (1.77) (0.15) (-0.43) (0.43) (-0.41)
5year winning Ind -0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 -0.11 -0.10 0.02 0.05
(-0.60) (0.71) (-0.13) (0.16) (1.59) (1.47) (1.02) (1.07) (-1.08) (-0.84) (0.20) (0.58)
5year losing Ind 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.21 0.31 0.32 0.36 0.39 0.44 0.48 0.27 0.29
(0.65) (0.71) (1.91) (2.08) (3.34) (3.15) (3.90) (3.77) (4.31) (4.20) (3.77) (3.78)
Ind 5year winner
within
- -0.06 -0.20 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06 -0.07 0.04 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08
Ind 5year loser
within
(-0.68) (-2.47) (-0.58) (-1.24) (-0.71) (-0.83) (0.50) (0.30) (0.23) (-0.31) (-0.38) (-1.30)
5year losing Ind- 0.11 0.01 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.55 0.57 0.25 0.24
5year winning Ind (0.88) (0.09) (1.67) (1.70) (1.86) (1.87) (1.94) (1.91) (3.66) (3.43) (2.20) (1.98)  
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Table 7 Risk-adjusted returns 
We estimate 60 ( 1,...,60)j   cross-sectional regressions on a monthly basis between January 1975 and December 2011  
0 1 , 1 2 , 1 4 , 1 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 ,
10 , 11
52 52 5 5
5
it jt jt i t jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
jt i t j
R b b R b size b BM b wkhWinner b wkhLoser b IndMomWinner b IndMomLoser b yearWinner b yearLoser
b yearWinningInd b
        

         
  ,5jt i t j ijtyearLosingInd e 
 
itR is the return to stock i  in month t. , 1i tR  , , 1i tBM  and , 1i tsize   are the return, book-to-market ratio and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month t-1 net of the 
month t-1 cross-sectional mean. 52wkhWinneri,t-j(52wkhLoseri,t-j) is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is 
ranked in the top (bottom) 30% in month t-j, and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in 
month t-j-12 to t-j. IndMomWinneri,t-j(IndMomLoseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to short-term winning (losing) industries in month t-j, and zero 
otherwise. Short term winning and losing industries are defined the top and bottom three industries ranked on 12-month value-weighted average industry returns, respectively. 5-year 
winneri,t-j (5-year loseri,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i’s past five-year return is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. 5-
year winning Indi,t-j ( 5-year losing Indi,t-j) is a dummy that takes the value of one if a stock i belongs to long-term winning and  losing industry in month t-j, and zero otherwise.  
Long term winning and losing industry are defined as the top and bottom three industries ranked on five-year value-weighted average industry returns. Long term industry contrarian 
performance is measured by buying stocks in losing industries and selling those in winning industries (e.g.
11 10jt jtb b ) in month t-j. The coefficient estimates of a given independent 
variable are average over 1,2,...,12j  for column labelled (1, 12), 13,14,...,24j  for column (13, 24)… and 1,2,...,60j  for columns labelled (1, 60). To obtain risk-adjusted 
returns, we run time series averages (one for each average), which are computed from the cross-sectional regressions, on the Fama-French (1996) three-factor model in Panel A.  We 
also run the averages on the Fama-French (2015) five-factor model, including two additional factors (the profitability factor and the asset growth factor) and the intercepts from the 
time-series regression is reported in Panel B. The numbers in the table are in percentage per month. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Monthly 
return (1,12)
Monthly 
return (1,12) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(13,24)
Monthly 
return 
(13,24) Jan 
& Apr Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(25,36)
Monthly 
return 
(25,36) Jan 
& Apr Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(37,48)
Monthly 
return 
(37,48) Jan 
& Apr Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(49,60)
Monthly 
return 
(49,60) Jan 
& Apr Excl. 
Monthly 
return (1,60)
Monthly 
return (1,60) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
5-year winner -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01
(-0.60) (0.18) (-0.67) (-0.21) (-0.49) (-0.29) (-0.23) (0.03) (-1.18) (-1.09) (-0.80) (-0.30)
5-year loser -0.04 -0.13 0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.02 0.12 0.09 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.02
(-0.49) (-1.68) (0.60) (-0.33) (0.95) (0.29) (1.68) (0.53) (0.46) (-0.86) (0.86) (0.41)
5year winning Ind -0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.10 0.08 -0.12 -0.10 -0.00 0.01
(-0.46) (0.21) (-0.34) (-0.30) (0.54) (0.42) (1.15) (1.21) (-1.15) (-0.92) (-0.07) (0.13)
5year losing Ind 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.19 0.30 0.29 0.36 0.34 0.43 0.43 0.26 0.26
(0.47) (0.52) (1.93) (1.95) (3.42) (3.12) (3.54) (3.43) (3.66) (3.02) (3.09) (3.02)
Panel A Fama-French 3-Factor Adjusted Returns
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Monthly 
return 
(1,12)
Monthly 
return (1,12) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(13,24)
Monthly 
return (13,24) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(25,36)
Monthly 
return (25,36) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
Monthly 
return 
(37,48)
Monthly return 
(37,48) Jan & 
Apr Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(49,60)
Monthly 
return 
(49,60) Jan & 
Apr Excl. 
Monthly 
return 
(1,60)
Monthly 
return (1,60) 
Jan & Apr 
Excl.
5-year loser- -0.00 -0.15 0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.04 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.02
5-year winner (-0.05) (-1.54) (0.85) (-0.13) (1.06) (0.42) (1.55) (1.41) (1.05) (0.89) (1.42) (0.24)
5year losing Ind- 0.09 0.02 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.54 0.53 0.27 0.25
5year winning Ind (0.67) (0.18) (1.69) (1.75) (1.92) (1.86) (2.32) (2.34) (3.18) (3.01) (2.54) (2.36)
5-year winner -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06
(-0.98) (-0.43) (-1.02) (-0.80) (-1.12) (-1.09) (-1.03) (-0.90) (-1.26) (-1.39) (-1.41) (-1.22)
5-year loser -0.09 -0.19 -0.03 -0.10 0.00 -0.06 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.03 -0.05
(-1.16) (-2.24) (-0.40) (-1.27) (0.08) (-0.80) (1.93) (1.15) (1.62) (0.77) (0.48) (-1.22)
5year winning Ind 0.06 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.10 -0.12 -0.08 0.05 0.07
(0.59) (1.36) (0.81) (0.88) (1.01) (0.83) (1.19) (1.45) (-1.20) (-0.78) (0.65) (0.97)
5year losing Ind 0.02 -0.00 0.13 0.14 0.31 0.30 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.24 0.22
(0.04) (-0.06) (1.53) (1.49) (3.31) (2.55) (2.75) (2.60) (2.78) (2.52) (2.89) (2.86)
5-year loser- -0.04 -0.17 0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.00 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.01
5-year winner (-0.42) (-1.64) (0.31) (-0.50) (0.78) (0.08) (2.37) (1.60) (2.18) (1.57) (1.28) (0.18)
5year losing Ind- -0.04 -0.14 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.20 0.25 0.22 0.43 0.37 0.19 0.16
5year winning Ind (-0.36) (-1.02) (0.40) (0.34) (1.78) (1.65) (1.83) (1.78) (2.89) (2.78) (1.86) (1.52)
Panel B Fama-French 5-Factor Adjusted Returns
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Table 8 The Sharpe ratio 
 
Panel A reports the monthly Sharpe ratio for each individual factor and long term contrarian performance for stocks and industries. 5-year Ind. is industry contrarian performance by 
longing in stocks in losing industries and shorting in stocks in winning industries. 5-year stock is stock contrarian performance by longing in loser stocks and shorting in winner 
stocks. The two types of contrarian performance are estimated by the previous cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth regressions. The Sharpe ratio is calculated as the ratio of the mean 
return to its standard deviation for each factor and type of contrarian performance. MKT, SMB and HML stands for the market, the size and the value factors in Fama-French (1993) 
three-factor model. 5F_SMB, 5F_HML, 5F_ROE and 5F_INV are the size, the value, the profitability and the investment factors in Fama-French (2015) five-factor model. Panel B 
reports the maximum monthly Sharpe ratio achievable from each factor model (i.e. the three-factor model and the five-factor model) and each type of contrarian performance. The 
maximum Sharpe ratio is calculated as  1' f f fV 
 , in which f  is the vector of mean factor returns and fV  is the variance-covariance matrix of the factor returns. The last row 
in Panel B reports the p-value for the null hypothesis that the factor risk premia are jointly equal to zero [(T-N)/N]SSR is distributed central F(N, T-N) where N is the number of 
portfolios, T is the number of time-series observations and SSR is the maximum squared Sharpe ratio.  
 
MKT SMB HML 5F_SMB 5F_HML 5F_ROE 5F_INV 5-year Ind. 5-year stock
0.1098 0.0285 0.1032 0.0242 0.1005 0.0802 0.2512 0.1337 0.1017
CAPM 3F-model 5F-model 5-year Ind. 5-year stock
0.1098 0.1503 0.2981 0.2525 0.1351
(0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Panel A Sharpe ratios
Individual factors Contrarian performance
Panel B Maximum Sharpe ratios
Factor models Contrarian performance
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Table 9 Economic States and industry contrarian performance 
 
This table reports results of industry contrarian performance according to different economic states. The monthly industry contrarian performance is estimated by the cross-sectional 
Fama-MacBeth regressions (Eq.(1)). Panel A reports the industry contrarian performance in the three waves of economic recessions according to the Office of National Statistics 
(ONS) in the UK. The rest of the months are defined as “other times”. Panel B reports the performance of industry contrarian portfolios in four states according to the overall market 
performance measured by the equally weighted market return index. The four states the 25 worst stock return months, the remaining 149 negative return months, the 184 positive 
months other than the 25 best, and the best 25 months in the sample. The last rows in Panel A and B report average GDP growth rates and market returns during each sub-sample 
period. The numbers in the table are in percentage. Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
1980:Q1-1981:Q2 1991:Q1-1991:Q4 2008:Q2-2009:Q3 Other times
Losing industries 0.01 0.37 -0.15 0.32
(0.04) (1.46) (-0.89) (3.04)
Winning industries 0.23 0.15 -1.55 0.05
(0.33) (0.49) (-2.37) (0.90)
Losing industries- -0.21 0.23 1.40 0.26
Winning industries (-0.36) (0.74) (2.42) (2.30)
Avg. GDP Growth -2.41 -1.49 -4.41 3.15
Best 25 months Worst 25 months Next  Best and Positive(184) Next Worst and Negative (149)
Losing industries 1.17 -0.22 0.43 0.07
(2.61) (-1.18) (4.87) (0.91)
Winning industries 0.30 -1.28 0.10 0.03
(0.69) (-3.37) (1.56) (0.42)
Losing industries- 0.87 1.06 0.33 0.03
Winning industries (1.84) (1.98) (2.05) (0.21)
Avg. Market ret 8.38 -12.65 2.37 -2.54
Panel A: ONS Recessions
Panel B: Classified by the overall market performance
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Table 10 Valuation Uncertainty and Industry Contrarian Performance 
This table reports industry contrarian performance conditioning on accruals, idiosyncratic volatility, competition and analyst coverage. All four conditioning variables are constructed 
on the industry level.  We define accruals the same as Sloan (1996). Industry IVOL is the standard deviation of the residuals from regressing daily industry portfolio returns on daily 
FTSE All index return (the market return) from July of the last year to June of the current year. We measure industry concentration using the Herfindahl index. According to each 
stock’s industry membership, the number of analysts is aggregated in a given industry and then is divided by the total number of firms in the industry. The sample 20 industries are 
separated into the top (bottom) 10 industries according to one of the four measures. We then re-run the Fama-MacBeth regressions for the two groups to obtain raw returns. By using 
the Fama-French three-factor (FF3) and five-factor (FF5) models, we obtain risk-adjusted returns for each portfolio. t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
(1, 60)
(1, 60) ex. 
Jan & Apr.
(1, 60)
(1, 60) ex. 
Jan & Apr.
(1, 60)
(1, 60) ex. Jan & 
Apr.
(1, 60)
(1, 60) ex. Jan & 
Apr.
Losing industries (L) 0.39 0.47 0.30 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.27 0.33
(3.12) (3.74) (2.99) (2.87) (3.01) (3.20) (2.72) (3.01)
Winning industries (W) -0.01 -0.07 0.16 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.06
(-0.09) (-0.34) (1.42) (0.94) (0.30) (0.73) (0.88) (0.60)
L-W 0.41 0.53 0.15 0.19 0.30 0.28 0.18 0.26
(2.53) (2.70) (0.66) (0.86) (2.31) (2.20) (1.20) (1.53)
FF3 0.49 0.53 0.12 0.14 0.22 0.21 0.14 0.13
(3.22) (3.22) (1.06) (1.25) (1.99) (1.96) (1.34) (1.44)
FF5 0.32 0.30 0.00 -0.01 0.18 0.17 0.05 0.00
(2.33) (1.93) (0.06) (-0.14) (1.70) (1.69) (0.36) (0.05)
Avg. obs 633 592 741 506
Avg. the accual ratio 0.1373 -0.1825 Avg. Herf 0.4968 0.1020
Losing industries (L) 0.46 0.50 0.19 0.24 0.07 0.02 0.70 0.78
(3.98) (4.01) (2.39) (2.76) (0.10) (0.13) (3.86) (4.20)
Winning industries (W) 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.13 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00
(0.77) (0.46) (0.87) (1.19) (-0.20) (-0.30) (-0.10) (-0.02)
L-W 0.39 0.45 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.71 0.78
(2.60) (2.85) (0.80) (0.75) (0.67) (0.21) (3.99) (4.20)
FF3 0.44 0.45 0.11 0.08 -0.08 -0.06 0.72 0.70
(3.20) (3.13) (1.03) (0.60) (-0.20) (-0.31) (3.65) (4.23)
FF5 0.25 0.21 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09 0.53 0.59
(1.98) (1.82) (-0.42) (-0.75) (-1.02) (-1.20) (3.60) (3.83)
Avg. obs 551 698 780 541
Avg. IVOL 0.0358 0.0068 Avg.Analyst 13 4
High IVOL industries Low IVOL  industries
Panel B Panel D
Low Analyst Cov.  IndustriesHigh Analyst Cov. Industries
Low Concentrated IndustriesHigh Concentrated IndustriesLow Accrual IndustriesHigh Accrual Industries
Panel A Panel C
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Appendix   
A1. Data type filters 
Non common equity Company name or data type search 
Duplicate 
a DUPLICATE DUPL DUP DUPE DULP DUPLI 
American Depository receipt 
b ADR GDR 
Preferred stocks PREFERRED PF PFD PREF  'PF' 
Warrants WARRANT WARRANTS WARRT 
Debt DEB DB DCB DEBT DEBENTURES 
Unit Trust TRUST UNIT TST UNIT UNIT TRUST UT 
Investment  company INVESTMENT TRUST INVESTMENT 
a 
If two firms have a same name without other distinguishable characteristics, we choose the firm with an 
earliest coverage in the Datastream to ensure no duplicated firms included.  
b 
We also check each stock’s quoted currency and remove those that are not quoted in the British Sterling. This 
procedure screens out American Depository Receipts traded on LSE.  
Note: This table lists words used in a screen to identify Datastream securities for which the underlying 
asset is not common equity. The search is carried out in the data type and in company name. 
 
 
 
